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Fraudulent Advertising: The Right Of A
Public Attorney To Seek Restitution
For Consumers
The power of a public attorney to seek relief for consumers
has expanded rapidly in recent years. This comment examines
the standing of a public attorney to seek restitution for defrauded
private parties in conjunction with an action to enjoin fraudulent
advertising. The standing issue is first analyzed in a discussion
of recent judicial decisions. The author then examines the legis-
lative intent behind A.B. 1763, a 1972 amendment to the Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code, which, the author con-
cludes, gives the public attorney standing to seek restitution for vic-
tims of fraudulent advertising.
Consumer fraud is an area of increasing public concern.1 This com-
ment deals with one aspect of consumer fraud-fraudulent advertising
-and with the most recent attempt of the California Legislature to
deal with the problem.2  By amending California Business and Profes-
sions Code Section 17535, the Legislature has provided that courts
may order restitution to "any person in interest."3  This supplements
an existing provision permitting the Attorney General to bring actions
for injunction.4 The problem with this enactment is that it leaves un-
clear whether the Attorney General or others may seek restitution for
private persons in conjunction with their injunctive actions. To resolve
this ambiguity it is necessary to explore the judicial background, availa-
ble indicia of legislative intent, and analogous federal law.
Judicial Background
Discussion of the judicial attitude toward this problem is uniquely
1. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796(1971).
2. A.B. 1763, CAL. STAiS. 1972, c. 244. Section 1 of the bill is particu-larly relevant and, in addition to previously held injunctive powers, courts of competentjurisdiction are given the power to ". . . make such orders or judgments, including the
appointment of a receiver, as.. . may be necessary to restore to any person in interest
any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of
any practice in this chapter declared to be unlawful."
3. Id.
4. CAL. Bus. & PRop. CODE §17535.
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aided by a case currently before the Supreme Court of California
which epitomizes the problem encountered in an attempt by the State
Attorney General to seek restitution on behalf of private citizens. This
case, People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County5 (hereinafter
Jayhill-the real party in interest), will soon be determined as to the
parties involved. However, because A.B. 1763 was enacted after this
case was filed, for parties with subsequent factually identical actions
the law will remain unsettled.
The problem in the Jayhill case centers on the powers of the Attor-
ney General to sue for injunctive relief and, in the same action, to seek
restitution for nonparty victims of fraudulent advertising. The Jayhill
facts, substituting a hypothetical Mr. C. for the victims in the case, are
illustrated as follows: Assume that Mr. C., enjoying an evening at
home with his family, was confronted at his door by a gentlemen repre-
senting himself as an employee of a national firm which had selected
Mr. C.'s family as an evaluation unit for their product. Relying upon
the representative's promises that the product was being placed in his
home for only a small service charge,6 that the company would monitor
and rectify all the future school problems of his children,7 and other
promises," Mr. C. found himself the owner of a new set of encyclo-
pedias. The fact that these assertions were false did not immediately
affect Mr. C., since he did not know of their falsity and, indeed, could
not become aware of it for years in the case of several of the promisesf
Although Mr. C. would have a remedy at law for rescission, in the
majority of such cases the remedy would prove inadequate for reasons
discussed later in this comment.10 In the Jayhill case, the Office of
the State Attorney General filed a complaint against the company in
Los Angeles superior court upon a receipt of numerous reports of such
fraudulent advertising. In the prayer, the Attorney General requested
that the court order the defendant to offer restitution to the several
5. 23 Cal. App. 3d 128, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972).
6. Attorney General's Brief for Petition for Hearing, submitted before the Su-
preme Court of California. On file, California State Law Library, Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Jayhill Brief].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. A person "who has been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation to enter
into a contract . . . m have the contract . . . set aside and secure a restitution of
those benefits lost to hi by the transaction." Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 414,
115 P.2d 977, 980 (1941); "A party to a contract may rescind the same . . . Ei]f the
consent of the party rescinding or of any party jointly contracting with him, was given
by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence . . . ." CAL.
Civ. CODE §1689. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
why this remedy often proves inadequate.
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thousand defrauded individuals." The trial court sustained a demur-
rer to the complaint. 2 Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal, Second
District, affirmed the lower court ruling that the Attorney General had
no power to seek restitution for nonparty individuals since he had not
himself been harmed and thus did not have standing to bring such
an action. A hearing before the California Supreme Court was granted
on April 19, 1972.
The Right of the Attorney General to Seek Injunctive Relief
In addressing the issue of the standing of the Attorney General to
sue for injunction on behalf of private parties, California courts iden-
tify two bases under which standing can be acquired: (1) the com-
mon law powers of the Attorney General, or (2) an express statutory
provision.13
It is generally agreed that under his common law powers, the Attor-
ney General has standing to seek injunctions against persons in viola-
tion of the laws of the state if a public right or interest is involved.
For example, in People v. Centr-O-Mart, the California Supreme
Court held that the Attorney General has broad common law powers
to take action and seek adequate relief in order to protect public rights
and interests. 4  Quoting from Pierce v. Superior Court,' the court
held that
the Attorney General, as the chief law officer of the state, had
broad powers derived from the common law, and, in the absence
of any legislative restriction, has the power to file any civil action
or proceeding directly involving the rights and interests of the
state, or which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the law of
the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of the pub-
lic rights and interests.' 6
Similarly, in People ex rel. Lynch v. San Diego Unified School Dis-
trict, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, directed the school district
to "exercise its discretion to take reasonably feasible steps to prevent,
alleviate, and eliminate racial imbalance.' 17  Overruling a demurrer
alleging lack of standing on the part of the Attorney General, the court
stated that in the absence of legislative restriction the Attorney Gen-
11. People v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 3d 128, 100
Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972).
12. Following the sustaining of the demurrer, the people petitioned for a writ of
mandate. An alternative writ was issued. The writ was discharged upon appeal.13. People v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 234, 240, 50 P. 305, 306(1897).
14. 34 Cal. 2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950).
15. 1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d 453 (1934).
16. 34 Cal. 2d 702, 704, 214 P.2d 378, 379 (1950).
17. 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 257, 96 Cal. Rptr- 658, 660 (1971); cerl. denied, 405
U.S. 1016 (1972).
170
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eral was free to bring such an action when necessary for the protection
of public rights and interests. 8
In addition to the aforementioned common law powers, there are
specific statutory provisions which permit injunctive actions to be
brought by the Attorney General. In the Jayhill case, and in any case
involving false advertising, these provisions are found in California
Civil Code, Section 3369, which provides that
any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair
competition within this State may be enjoined in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction' a . . . . Actions for injunction under this sec-
tion may be prosecuted by the Attorney General. .. in the name
of the people of the State of California.20
The California Business and Professions Code, Section 17535, con-
tains the same basic provisions.2 '
On the other hand, there are certain statutes which impose a limita-
tion upon the right of any plaintiff to bring an action. The California
Code of Civil Procedure, Section 367, provides in part, "[e]very
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
S. .22 Sections 22, 26, and 30 also restrict the power of one at-
tempting to bring suit on behalf of another.2 3  In general, these sec-
tions hold that an action consists of a primary right coupled with a
corresponding duty. When this duty is breached a remedial right
arises in favor of the plaintiff and a remedial duty arises in the de-
fendant. The right to pursue the remedy is owned by the person to
whom the obligation is owed and to no other person.24 "[An action
is nothing else than the right or power of prosecuting what is owed to
one-which is but to say an obligation," as stated by the supreme
court in Frost v. Witter.25 Therefore, the courts which have held that
the Attorney General was not a real party in interest within the mean-
ing of the statutes have done so on the ground that the Attorney Gen-
eral had sustained no damage and no public rights and interest were
18. Id.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §3369, para. 2.
20. CAL. CIV. CODE §3369, para. 5.
21. See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
22. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §367, relating to parties to civil actions.
23. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §22: An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court
of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or
protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a pub-
lic offense.
§26: An obligation is a legal duty, by which one person is bound to do or not to
do a certain thing, and arises from (1) contract, or (2) operation of law.
§30: A civil action is prosecuted by one party against another for the declaration,
enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong.
24. Hurt v. Haering, 190 Cal. 198, 211 P. 228 (1922); McKee v. Dodd, 152
Cal. 637, 93 P. 854 (1908).
25. 132 Cal. 421, 426, 64 P. 705, 707 (1901); see also Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
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involved. The Supreme Court of California in People v. Pacheco,
stated that "[a] private person has not the right or power to use . . .
the name of the people for the purpose of obtaining redress for private
wrongs."2 6 In People v. Oakland Water Front Company, the supreme
court held that the Attorney General's right to initiate actions on behalf
of the state was limited to those situations in which the rights and in-
terests of the state are "directly" involved. 7  Some appellate courts
have similarly required that the interest of the state in such cases be
"primary and direct, '28 or "present, direct, and immediate. ''20 Exam-
ples of "direct" interests include the state's interest in regulation and
stabilization of certain industries,8 ° abatement of a public nuisance, 1
and monitoring and regulation of election procedures.3 2  However,
no definite criteria appear to have been developed and each case is de-
termined on its own merits.
The Right of the Attorney General to Seek Restitution
In addition to seeking an injunction in the Jayhill case, the Attorney
General is further asking the court to order that restitution be offered
to the private victims of the fraud. Such a request raises two main
issues: the standing of the Attorney General to actively seek restitution
on behalf of nonparties in his injunctive action and the general equity
power of the court to order restitution once equity jurisdiction is prop-
erly invoked.
While conceding that, in certain cases, the Attorney General has
standing to seek injunction on behalf of private parties, the Jayhill
Corporation urges that neither the common law nor the statutory powers
of the Attorney General are appropriate when an order of restitution is
sought with the injunction. It is argued that the Attorney General is
not a party to the contract,33 that no public rights or interests are in-
volved, and that, under these circumstances, he could not meet the re-
quirements of a real party in interest under the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, Section 367. In support of this argument the Jayhill Corporation
cited the cases and statutory material previously discussed.3 4
26. 29 Cal. 210, 213 (1865).
27. 118 Cal. 234, 240, 50 P. 305, 306 (1897).
28. People v. San Diego, 71 Cal. App. 421, 433, 236 P. 377, 381 (1925).
29. People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 34, 120 P.2d 946, 957 (1942).
30. Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. 2d 661, 91 P.2d 599 (1939).
31. People v. Lina, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941).
32. Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d 453 (1934).
33. CAL. Civ. CODE §1692.
34. Jayhill Corporation, Brief In Answer to Petition for Hearing, submitted
before the Supreme Court of California. On file, California State Law Library, Sacra-
mento, California [hereinafter cited as Jayhill Corp., Jayhill Brief].
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The Attorney General contends that he has standing to sue for resti-
tution under both his broad common law powers and under the specific
statutory enactments granting him power to seek an injunction. 35
The apparent strength of the Attorney General's argument lies in his
contention that the true issue is not whether a public attorney has the
proper standing to sue for restitution on behalf of nonparty individuals
but whether, once equity jurisdiction has been properly invoked in the
injunctive action, the court may render a decree which will afford full
justice. This would necessarily include restitution to the defrauded in-
dividuals, otherwise, "the guilty party keeps his gains and is merely
ordered not to defraud people in the same way again." '
6
A court of equity has broad discretion to determine the nature and
scope of allowable relief.37  This is true whether a fraudulent adver-
tiser is enjoined in an action brought pursuant to a relevant statute or
pursuant to the common law powers of the Attorney General. The
Court of Appeal, First District, in Roman v. Ries, stated "[e]quity
. . . will adjust itself to those situations where right and justice would
be defeated but for its intervention."3 s  There is considerable addi-
tional state39 and federal40 authority in support of this position.
Perhaps through an oversight, but more likely due to the surfeit of
authority concerning the inherent power of the equity court, the Jay-
hill Corporation declined to counter on this point and merely reiterated
its position that the only party that may properly bring such an action
for restitution is the one directly harmed and that person is not the At-
torney General. The appellate court also ignored this aspect and con-
centrated its efforts, instead, on an analysis of the standing problem.
The argument by the Attorney General that he has standing and is a
proper party to initiate a suit and seek restitution would appear to stand
or fall upon a finding of whether the rights involved are purely private
or involve public rights and interests which the Attorney General might
properly deem to be within his power to assert and protect.
It is submitted that public interests are involved. The state has a
clear and compelling interest in eliminating fraudulent advertising and
35. Attorney General's Jayhill Brief.
36. CONTNUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REvIEw OF SELECTED 1965 CODE LEGIS-
LATIoN 21 (1965).
37. A court of equity has full power "to do complete rather than truncated jus-
tice." Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
38. 259 Cal. App. 2d 65, 70, 66 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (1968).
39. People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of California, 201 Cal. App. 2d
765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962); Holibaugh v. Stokes, 192 Cal. App. 2d 564, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 528 (1961).
40. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the chancellor to
do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the particular case." Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); "A court of equity ought to do justice completely,
and not by halves." Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530 (1913).
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in assisting the unfortunate consumer to regain whatever he has lost as
a result of the fraud.4 Public policy demands that the consumer be
afforded relief where evidence of fraud is clearly shown. As stated in
Vasquez v. Superior Court: 2 "Protection of unwary consumers from be-
ing duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority
in contemporary society."4 In many cases it is impractical for the in-
dividual to bring suit on his own behalf due to the fact that he may not
be aware of legal forms of assistance or his claim may be too small to
justify litigation.4
The judicial background to A.B. 1763 as illustrated by the argu-
ments presented in Jayhill demonstrates the primary concern over
whether a particular interest is public or private. However, as indi-
cated above, standing may be granted by a specific statute which
makes a binding determination that certain activities do affect a direct
public interest and which also specifies appropriate remedies. The
ultimate question at issue in this comment is whether A.B. 1763 was
intended to constitute such a specific statute. For, regardless of how
Jayhill is decided, the impact of the new statute is uncertain.
The Impact of A.B. 1763
A. Legislative Intent
Before any attempt can be made to determine the probable effect
of Business and Professions Code, Section 17535, as amended by
A.B. 1763, it will be necessary to ascertain the legislative intent in pass-
ing the amendment. 4, Traditionally, this is accomplished by first con-
sidering the statute on its face,46 followed by evidence of intent gained
from extrinsic evidence such as statements of the proponents of the
bill,47 and lastly, by a consideration of public policy. 48
Looking at the wording of the document, there appear to be am-
biguities which present the possibility of future conflict and disagree-
ment. Its thrust is not so obvious nor its terms so clear that resort to
41. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text infra.
42. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
43. Id. at 808, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
44. See notes 74-81 and accompanying text infra.
45. In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all important or
controlling factor. United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50 (1942).
46. "When the language and meaning of a statute is clear and certain, there is no
room for the application of the rules of construction." Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Em-
ployment Commission, 101 P.2d 165, 172 (1940); a! 'd, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P.2d 935
(1941).
47. In interpretation of a statute of doubtful meaning, it is proper to take into
consideration its purpose. Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.2d 756 (1931).
48. When interpreting statutes, courts may consider the general policy of the law
and this is proper where the statute in question is a part of other legislation designed as
a whole to establish an express state policy. 50 AM. Jun. Statutes §299 (1944).
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interpretation and construction will be rendered unnecessary. 4 Para-
graph 1 of Section 1 of the amended statute empowers ". . . any court
of competent jurisdiction. .. [to] make such orders or judgments...
which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money
or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means
of any practices in this chapter declared to be unlawful." 50  [emphasis
added]. Paragraph 2 of the same section states "[a]ctions for injunc-
tions under this section may be prosecuted by the Attorney General
or any district attorney. . . ."51 [emphasis added]. It should be noted
that S.B. 912 extends this power to city attorneys, city prosecutors, and
county counsels.5 2
The result is that the Attorney General, or any other enumerated
public attorney, is authorized to invoke the equity power of the court in
an injunctive suit. Once this is accomplished, may the public attorney
actively seek the restitution that this law places within the power of the
court to grant? The amendment, on its face, does not resolve this
question. For this reason, resort to extrinsic evidence is both necessary
and proper.
By literal construction of the statute, an argument can be made that
the Legislature, by specifically empowering the Attorney General to
seek injunctions against false advertisers and declining to specifically
grant him restitutory powers, intended him not to have the latter power.
The statute empowers the court to grant restitution to any person in in-
terest. 53  Arguably, this could include the Attorney General or other
appropriate public attorneys if the rights and interests involved are con-
sidered public as well as private. 54 In any event, any conclusions
drawn from a consideration of this doctrine may not be determinative
upon the ultimate conclusion since, like other rules of construction, a
literal approach gives way when it would operate contrary to the legis-
lative intent to which it is subordinate or where its application would
nullify the essence of the statute.55
Additional evidence of legislative intent can be deduced from the
presence of certain other statutes 8 concerned with fraudulent advertis-
ing and by a consideration of three other bills passed in conjunction
49. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
50. A.B. 1763, CAL. STATS. 1972 c. 244.
51. Id.
52. S.B. 912, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 711.
53. A.B. 1763, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 244.
54. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.
55. "Once the intention of the legislature is ascertained it will be given effect
even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute." People v.
Black, 45 Cal. App. 2d 87, 94, 113 P.2d 746, 750 (1941), appeal dismissed, 315 U.S.
782 (1941); Crawford v. Payne, 12 Cal. App. 2d 485, 55 P.2d 1240 (1936); see also
In re Sekeguchi, 123 Cal. App. 537, 11 P.2d 655 (1932).
56. See note 48 supra; see notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.
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with A.B. 1763. 17 Business and Professions Code Sections 1753458
and 17536,59 already in force for a number of years, include penal and
civil sanctions for use against fraudulent advertisers. Section 17536,
in particular, was added due to the previous ineffectiveness of the ex-
isting code sections in dealing with the problem.60 This would appear
to establish a legislative trend, of which A.B. 1763 would be a part,
toward more effective control of, and stiffer punishment for, consciohs
defrauders. Also, it can be shown that A.B. 1763 was part of a
"package"' which broadened the scope of a public attorney's authority
and power in regard to prosecuting violators of Chapter 1 (Business
and Professions Code, Section 17500 et seq.). 2  The other bills are
free of ambiguity and were obviously intended to improve the public
attorney's position vis-a-vis false advertisers. 63  Assuming that there
was no other evidence available to determine the intent of the Legisla-
ture, it seems logical to infer from an examination of the bills in the
"package," three of which unequivocally improve the position of one
attempting to gain redress for losses to a fraudulent advertiser, that the
fourth bill, while not as clear, is also intended to improve the position
of the victimized consumer.
The above indicators are far from conclusive and it is probable that
the true intent of the Legislature cannot be established to any satisfac-
tory degree by mere examination of the statute and other legislation
concerned with false advertising. This being the case, it is proper,
as stated earlier, to resort to further extrinsic evidence in an attempt
to shed additional light on the ambiguous feature of the enactment. 4
This amendment was proposed by the Office of the State Attorney
General and various district attorney consumer fraud units throughout
57. S.B. 912, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 711, A.B. 1264, CAL. STATs. 1972, c. 1105,
A.B. 1267, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 823.
58. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17534, CA.. STATS. 1941, c. 63, at 727.
59. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536, CAL. STATs. 1965, c. 827, at 2419.
60. CoNTiNuiNG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, RE vIEw OF SELECTED 1965 CODE
LEGISLATION 21 (1965).
61. Each of the bills contain cross references to one of the other bills: A.B.
1763, A.B. 1264, and A.B. 1267 refer to S.B. 912. S.B. 912 refers to A.B. 1763. The
effectiveness of the various provisions in each bill depends upon the sequence in which
the bills are chaptered. Three make changes to either Section 17535 or 17536 of the
Business and Professions Code. A.B. 1267 amends Code of Civil Procedure §338 but
refers directly to Business and Professions Code §17536.
62. The chapter establishes what conduct will be considered unlawful in the field
of advertising.
63. S.B. 192 extends the power to bring actions against fraudulent advertisers to
city attorneys, city prosecutors, and county counsels. A.B. 1264 deletes the exemp-
tion earlier in effect regarding false advertising in the area of real estate. A.B. 1267
extends the statute of limitations to three years for an action brought by the enumer-
ated public attorneys for civil damages for fraudulent advertising.
64. 50 AM. Jun. Statutes §§214, 228 (1944).
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the state.60  The purpose in proposing the bill was to clarify the power
of the public attorneys to seek restitution on behalf of victims of false
advertising.66 The motive of the proponents was twofold: the vic-
tim's remedy at law was usually inadequate 7 and a bill of this type was
required to give the Attorney General added leverage against false ad-
vertisers in order to insure proper redress and to provide an addi-
tional deterrent to this conduct.08
While this evidence provides an insight into the intentions and mo-
tives of the proposing agency, it does not provide the public or the
courts with any true measure of the legislative intent itself. Perhaps
the most enlightening extrinsic evidence of this intent is to be gleaned
from testimony taken at the California Assembly Judiciary Committee
hearing during which the bill was first considered. Although there is
no written record of the hearing, there is testimony available as to the
proceedings.69 The committee noted that in the past many courts have
been reluctant to punish perpetrators of consumer crime. 70  The sub-
sequent approval of the bill by the committee would appear to be strong
evidence of the Legislature's intent that the courts should no longer
consider themselves constrained when dealing with the fraudulent ad-
vertiser. 71 It is submitted that it was the intent of the Legislature then
and now that the equity court have and use its power to order restitu-
tion to nonparty individuals in an injunctive action brought by the At-
torney General or other public attorney. 72 Considerations of public
policy were undertaken by the committee and were a major motivating
force behind favorable recommendation of the bill.73
B. Public Policy
In view of the above indications regarding the legislative intent,
there is good reason to believe that at the time of the first litigation in-
volving A.B. 1763 the statute will be construed to allow public attor-
neys to seek restitution on behalf of defrauded consumers. When
65. Telephone interview with Peter Demauro, Deputy Attorney General, State of
California, Sacramento, California, Oct. 5, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Demauro].
66. Demauro.
67. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text infra.
68. Demauro.
69. Telephone interview with Hal Eisenberg, Committee Consultant, Assembly
Judiciary Committee, Sacramento, California, Oct. 27, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Eisen-
berg].
70. "The conscious defrauder has been, and in many courts still is, treated more
tenderly than other wrongdoers; the interests of those who have suffered at his hands
have been traditionally only grudgingly protected." Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of
1960, 38 TEXAS L. 1Ev. 439, (1960); see note 60 and accompanying text supra.
71. Eisenberg.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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these indications are supplemented by strong public policy considera-
tions such a conclusion would appear inescapable.
Assuming that the consumer is aware that he has been victimized, 4
there is great doubt whether he would know where to turn for help."
While any person may be the unwitting victim of fraud, it is evident
that the poor fall prey much more often than the more affluent."0
Most low income consumers are unaware of the existence of legal aid,
small claims courts, or agencies such as the Better Business Bureau and
therefore never consider the possibility of initiating legal process for
their benefit. 7 One surveyor of low income consumer problems stated
that "when asked directly where they would go for help if they found
themselves being cheated by a merchant, some 64 percent said they
did not know."'17  In the same survey, "only 3 percent of the families
said they would turn to a private lawyer for help. ' 79
Regrettably, it is doubtful whether a satisfactory result would be
achieved by even that small percentage who seek the services of a pri-
vate attorney. "Even where a good case exists, the damage to a con-
sumer resulting from a deceptive practice may be so trivial that a law-
suit is not worth the expense." 0  Moreover, experienced operators
carefully avoid extracting too large a sum from any one consumer on
the theory that no one will undertake the expense of a lawsuit merely
to vindicate a principle when such an action will cost him more than
his initial loss.8 '
A class action against the defrauder by the injured consumers may
not be a workable solution either. There has been a paucity of fully
litigated consumer class actions in California due to the extremely
complicated, expensive, and lengthy nature of such processes.8 2  A
statewide organization such as the Attorney General's Office is much
better equipped to assess the most effective means for halting wide-
74. In situations such as Jayhill the consumer is unlikely to be aware of the
fraud due to the fact that performance is often to be rendered several years after the
making of the contract. Attorney General's Jayhill Brief.
75. HEW, CONFERENCE ON THE EXTENSiON OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE PooR at
64 (1964).
76. "[Tlhe evidence is clear that the poor tend to deal with less ethical sellers,
encounter defective goods more often, and obviously miss their payments more often."
THE LAW AND THE Low INCOME CONSUMER, 127 (C. Katz ed. 1968).
77. Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
78. CONFERENCE, supra note 75, at 64.
79. Id. at 65.
80. Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 5 (1971); see also, Report of National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorder, 274-275 (Bantam 1968).
81. Note, Transplanting Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Pro-
grams for protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966).
82. Note, Consumers Class Actions and Costs: An Economic Perspective on
Deceptive Advertising, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 592 (1971).
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spread fraudulent practices.83
Perhaps the strongest public policy consideration is the obvious in-
terest which the state has in curtailing fraudulent advertising. The re-
sults of widespread consumer fraud can have violent and devastating
effects upon the entire state.84 Aside from the more dramatic, but in-
frequent, violent demonstrations, the web which ensnares most con-
sumers is more pervasive and subtle. As stated in a Department of
Health, Education and Welfare conference considering the scope of the
problem, ". . . substantial numbers of today's poor have met with ex-
ploitation in the marketplace, have become almost hopelessly entangled
in installment debt, and have been faced with the legal penalties stem-
ming from missed payments.""5  This unfortunate result of consumer
fraud was the motivating force behind the wording in Vasquez v. Su-
perior Court which declared it to be the policy of the court to protect
"unwary consumers" from "unscrupulous sellers."' 86
Precedent In Federal Law
In the Jayhill case the Attorney General, by way of analogy, de-
pended heavily for support on federal precedent in the area of restitu-
tion. An appreciable amount of this precedent recognizes the right of
a public attorney to seek restitution on behalf of defrauded individuals
and the power of the equity court to fashion a workable decree.87 It
appears that federal law has accomplished by judicial evolution what
California is attempting to establish by the statute A.B. 1763.
Although the Court of Appeal, Second District, ignored this federal
authority when rendering the Jayhill opinion, it should be noted that
the Court of Appeal, Third District, in People ex rel. Mosk v. National
Research Company of California, stated that federal law in the area of
unfair competition is "more than ordinarily persuasive." 88  The court,
considering the meaning of Civil Code, Section 3369, stated, "[w]e
refrain from construing the language narrowly in a field where the
trend is opposed to unfair trade practices which affect the public in-
terest."'' 9
Both federal and state courts are strongly against limiting the broad
83. Note, Transplanting Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Pro-
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. RIv. 395 (1966).
84. Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
85. CONFERENCE, supra note 75, at 61.
86. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
87. See notes 91-101 and accompanying text supra.
88. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (1962).
89. Id. at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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inherent power of equity courtsY0 In Walling v. O'Grady91 and Mc-
Comb v. Frank Scerbo and Sons,92 the United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, held that an administrator within the United States De-
partment of Labor could bring an injunctive action and request restitu-
tion for back wages and overtime wages on behalf of individuals not
party to the action. An order requiring these payments was held
proper as an ancillary remedy to the primary injunctive relief. In
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry,93 a case involving the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 193 8,94 the United States Supreme Court held that a court
of equity has the "implied power to order reimbursement." 5 Indeed,
an order of restitution is a well established means of effectuating pub-
lic policy.90 In Securities Exchange Commission v. Golconda Mining
Company, the United States Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he injunc-
tion against future violations, while of some deterrent force, is only a
partial remedy since it does not correct the consequences of past con-
duct. . . One requirement . . . is a basic policy that those who
have engaged in proscribed conduct surrended all profits flowing there-
from."' 97 In the same case, the court held that the power of a trial court
to formulate effective decrees is not dependent upon the prayer in the
complaint but exists independently and is inherent in the very nature
of the equity court.9 8
Two recent federal cases involving corporate activity leading to
losses by the respective shareholders have further established the right
of representatives of the public to seek restitution on behalf of non-
party individuals and the power of the court to grant it. In Securities
Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,99 corporate
directors and others profited by the use of improperly withheld inside
information at the expense of corporate shareholders. The trial court
required that the defendants make restitution by placing their profits
in an account to be distributed to the victims as directed by the court.
In Securities Exchange Commission v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,100
the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, ordered the per-
sons profiting from a false and misleading prospectus to "disgorge all
90. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
91. 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
92. 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949).
93. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1970).
95. 361 U.S. 288, 291 n.91 (1960).
96. Securities Exch. Comm. v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
97. Id. at 259.
98. Id.
99. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
100. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the proceeds received in connection with the public offering of Manor
stock. . ." and appointed a trustee to receive the funds and distribute
them to the defrauded public investors.'""
The Jayhill Corporation contended that these federal cases are dis-
tinguishable from the facts in Jayhill, and are therefore not particularly
persuasive. The first ground for distinguishing these cases is that fed-
eral courts are not subject to the same procedural statutes as the Cal-
ifornia courts. 10 2 It is urged that restitution can be allowed nonparty
individuals in order to extend the effectiveness of federal regulatory
policies' °3 whereas California courts are restricted and may entertain
requests for restitution and grant such relief only within the statutory
boundaries delineated by the Legislature. This contention is techni-
cally valid but fails to recognize that federal courts have often held
that to have standing the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate injury to
a legally protected interest.10 4 This would seem to rebut the implica-
tion by the Jayhill Corporation that a federal court might allow any
uninterested party to bring suit.
Secondly, it is argued that the federal cases allowing restitution un-
der these circumstances involve complex and broad statutory schemes
with comprehensive powers, including rulemaking, vested in the body
charged with administering the regulatory scheme. 0 5 The contention
is that the allowance of restitution was required to prevent frustration
of the complex statutory schemes whereas this is unnecessary in Cali-
fornia in view of the existence of penal and civil penalties provided for
in the Business and Professions Code.' 0 6 Considering the scope of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,107 the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,108 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,109 as com-
pared with the code sections under which the Attorney General oper-
ates in this case-Civil Code Section 3369 and Business and Profes-
sions Code Section 17535-there is little doubt that the latter assume
lilliputian proportions when juxtaposed with these Brobdingnagians of
the federal system.
101. Id. at 1103.
102. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §367; CAL. Civ. CODE §1692.
103. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1964).
104. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1937).
105. Jayhill Corp., Jayhill Brief.
106. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17536 provides for a $2500 civil penalty for each
violation of the Code regarding advertising. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17534 pro-
vides that any violation of Chapter 1 of Div. 7, Part 3 of that code shall be a misde-
meanor.
107. 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1970).
108. 15 U.S.C. §§77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh
(1970).
109. 50 U.S.C. §1911 (1970).
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While the counter-arguments succeed in airing the differences be-
tween the federal statutes and the relevant California Code sections re-
garding size, they cannot deny the persuasiveness of the federal prece-
dent. Size alone cannot be considered an adequate criterion for dis-
tinction. It is submitted that the federal precedent strongly supports
the view that public attorneys have the standing to request, and equity
courts have the power to grant, restitution on behalf of defrauded in-
dividuals even without statutory reinforcement. When this federal
precedent is considered by analogy as expressing public policy at the
federal level, its effect on the interpretation of A.B. 1763 should be
significantly persuasive.
Conclusion
There are strong indications that the Legislature intended A.B. 1763
to permit public attorneys to seek restitution concurrently with injunc-
tive actions. Compelling public policy considerations demand relief
of this nature. Federal law has evolved to this point already. It is
submitted that A.B. 1763 both determines that the withholding of
wrongfully gained profits by a fraudulent advertiser is a matter of pub-
lic interest and provides the remedy-restitution-to be sought by
public attorneys on behalf of the victims.
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